Earth News Political Desk
In the complex chessboard of South Asian geopolitics, Bangladesh has
suddenly moved into the spotlight. The recent visit of Paul Kapur to Dhaka
from 3–5 March 2026 is not merely another diplomatic stop. It marks the
beginning of a new phase in relations between the United States and
Bangladesh after the electoral victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party
(BNP) in February 2026.
For Washington, the visit signals renewed engagement with a government that
is yet to define its global posture. For Bangladesh, it is a reminder that its
strategic choices are now being closely watched by the world’s major powers.
And for the region, it highlights the growing competition between the United
States and China for influence in South Asia.
Bangladesh finds itself in a delicate position. It is economically tied to both
sides of this global rivalry while trying to pursue an independent foreign policy.
As the new government led by Tarique Rahman settles into office, it faces a
difficult task: balancing economic necessity, national sovereignty and
geopolitical pressure.
A Timely Visit from Washington
Paul Kapur’s arrival in Dhaka came less than a month after the BNP formed the
government. Significantly, the trip followed his three-day visit to New Delhi,
where discussions focused on regional security, the Indo-Pacific strategy and
bilateral cooperation.
This sequence was not accidental. For the United States, India remains the
central pillar of its South Asia strategy. But Bangladesh—because of its
geography, economic growth and maritime access—has become increasingly
important in Washington’s calculations.
During his visit, Kapur met senior ministers, political leaders and
representatives from the business community. Official discussions covered
trade, investment, defence cooperation and visa-related issues. However,
behind the diplomatic language lay a broader concern: the expanding influence
of China in Bangladesh and the region.
Washington’s strategic thinking was made clear even before Kapur arrived in
Dhaka. In February 2026, while speaking at a hearing of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, he warned that if a hostile power dominated South Asia, it
could gain leverage over the global economy. In other words, the United States
sees the region not just as a local arena but as a key part of the global balance
of power.
Countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Bhutan may
be small compared to global giants, but their strategic location gives them
outsized importance. Control of sea lanes, access to markets and proximity to
India make them valuable partners—and potential targets of influence.
The Shadow of Great-Power Rivalry
Bangladesh’s importance has grown largely because of the escalating rivalry
between the United States and China. South Asia, once considered a secondary
theatre in global politics, has now become part of a larger strategic contest.
American officials have repeatedly voiced concerns about China’s rising
economic and security presence in the region. Chinese investments in
infrastructure, ports and defence partnerships have increased significantly
over the past decade.
This concern was visible in January 2026 when the US Ambassador to
Bangladesh, Brent Christensen, publicly warned Dhaka about the potential
risks of becoming too dependent on Beijing.
China responded swiftly. On 11 February 2026, Beijing rejected Washington’s
comments, arguing that attempts to disrupt China–Bangladesh cooperation
would fail. Chinese officials also accused the United States of using geopolitical
narratives to advance its own interests.
Such exchanges are not unusual in today’s international politics. But for
Bangladesh, they highlight the uncomfortable reality of being caught between
two powerful partners.
A New Government with Domestic Priorities
Amid this geopolitical tug-of-war, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has chosen
to focus primarily on domestic issues. Since assuming office, his government
has delayed major foreign engagements, including an invitation from the
Chinese ambassador to visit Beijing.
This cautious approach reflects the challenges facing the new administration.
Bangladesh is dealing with political instability, slowing economic growth and
uncertainty about its development trajectory. Under such conditions, foreign
policy must support economic recovery rather than become a source of new
tensions.
Rahman’s party campaigned on a platform called “Bangladesh Before All,”
which emphasises national interests and pragmatic diplomacy. The BNP
manifesto promises an independent foreign policy that engages with both
regional and global powers while protecting Bangladesh’s sovereignty.
In theory, this sounds sensible. But in practice, maintaining strategic
independence is far more complicated.
The Legacy of Past Governments
To understand the challenge ahead, it is necessary to look at how Bangladesh’s
foreign policy evolved in recent years.
During the long tenure of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami
League government, Dhaka attempted to maintain a delicate balance between
global powers. Hasina avoided fully joining the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy and
instead introduced the Indo-Pacific Outlook in 2023.
This policy aimed to attract international investment while keeping Bangladesh
neutral in major power rivalries. The idea was simple: cooperate with everyone
but become dependent on no one.
However, relations between Washington and the Hasina government
deteriorated over time. The United States criticised Bangladesh over
allegations of political violence, election interference and human rights abuses.
At the same time, China expanded its economic and security engagement with
Dhaka.
After Hasina’s departure, an interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus
attempted to recalibrate foreign policy. The Yunus government sought closer
ties with democratic partners such as Japan, India, the European Union, South
Korea and Australia.
Yet the reality of Bangladesh’s economy meant that dependence on China
continued to grow.
China’s Expanding Economic Footprint
China has become Bangladesh’s largest source of imports and a major partner
in infrastructure development. Much of Bangladesh’s industrial
sector—especially the ready-made garment industry—relies on Chinese raw
materials such as fabrics, yarn and machinery.
Today, China accounts for roughly 22 percent of Bangladesh’s total imports. In
monetary terms, this amounts to about 18 billion dollars annually. Over the
years, this figure has continued to rise.
Chinese financing has also played a major role in large infrastructure projects.
Initiatives such as the Padma Bridge Rail Link and the development of Payra
Port demonstrate Beijing’s deep involvement in Bangladesh’s development.
For Dhaka, Chinese funding offers clear advantages: it is fast, flexible and
usually comes with fewer political conditions than Western loans. But critics
warn that heavy dependence could reduce Bangladesh’s strategic autonomy.
China’s role in Bangladesh’s defence sector has also expanded. In January
2026, the Bangladesh Air Force signed an agreement with CETC International
to establish a UAV manufacturing plant in the country. Such projects highlight
the growing security dimension of China–Bangladesh cooperation.
The United States and Economic Opportunity
Despite China’s dominance in imports and infrastructure, the United States
remains Bangladesh’s most important export market.
Nearly 18 percent of Bangladesh’s total exports go to the United States. The
ready-made garment sector—one of the pillars of the Bangladeshi
economy—depends heavily on American consumers.
Export earnings from the US market reached about 48 billion dollars in the
financial year 2024–25. This economic reality gives Washington significant
leverage.
Recognising this, the Yunus-led interim government signed several agreements
with the United States and its partners before the 2026 elections. These
included a defence equipment transfer agreement with Japan and a free trade
agreement between the United States and Bangladesh.
These deals were meant to diversify Bangladesh’s partnerships and reduce
over-reliance on any single country.
But they also created expectations—particularly in Washington—that the next
government would continue this strategic shift.
The India Factor
Any discussion of Bangladesh’s foreign policy would be incomplete without
mentioning India.
Relations between Dhaka and India have always been complex, shaped by
geography, history and domestic politics. India is Bangladesh’s immediate
neighbour and an important economic partner. Yet issues such as border
management, water sharing and migration often create tensions.
The situation has become even more sensitive due to the presence of former
prime minister Sheikh Hasina in India after her departure from power. New
Delhi’s refusal to extradite her has sparked criticism within Bangladesh.
At the same time, the United States and India have strengthened their
strategic partnership. Their recent rapprochement following a tariff agreement
in February 2026 has added another layer to regional politics.
For the Tarique Rahman government, this means that pressure from
Washington to cooperate more closely with India could become politically
controversial at home.
Many Bangladeshis still remember remarks made by Donald Trump during
talks with Narendra Modi in 2025. Trump reportedly said he would “leave
Bangladesh to PM Modi,” a comment widely seen in Bangladesh as
patronising.
Such perceptions make it politically risky for any Bangladeshi government to
appear too closely aligned with India under US influence.
Three Major Challenges Ahead
The new BNP government therefore faces three major challenges.
1. Navigating Great-Power Competition
The first challenge is geopolitical pressure. The United States wants to contain
China’s influence in South Asia, while China seeks to deepen economic ties
with Bangladesh.
Dhaka cannot afford to alienate either side. But maintaining neutrality will
become increasingly difficult as rivalry between Washington and Beijing
intensifies.
2. Balancing Economic Dependence
The second challenge is economic. Bangladesh relies on the United States for
exports and China for imports and infrastructure financing.
This dual dependence forces Dhaka into a delicate balancing act. Any
disruption in trade with either partner could have serious consequences for
economic growth.
3. Managing Strategic Expectations
The third challenge is diplomatic. The United States expects Bangladesh to
continue expanding defence cooperation with Western partners and reduce
reliance on Chinese security partnerships.
Whether the BNP government is willing—or able—to meet these expectations
remains uncertain.
A Narrow Path to Strategic Autonomy
In theory, Bangladesh’s best option is strategic autonomy: engaging with all
major powers while avoiding alignment with any single bloc.
But achieving this goal requires careful diplomacy and economic resilience.
If Bangladesh becomes too dependent on China, it risks strategic vulnerability.
If it moves too close to the United States, it may face economic consequences
and domestic political backlash.
The challenge is not just foreign policy but national development. Bangladesh
must strengthen its own economic base so that it has greater freedom in
choosing its partners.
A New Phase in US–Bangladesh Relations
Paul Kapur’s visit signals Washington’s desire to reset relations with Dhaka
after years of tension under Sheikh Hasina.
For the United States, engaging the new BNP government offers an
opportunity to counter China’s influence and strengthen partnerships in South
Asia.
For Bangladesh, the visit is a reminder that global powers are watching closely.
Washington will likely encourage Dhaka to increase cooperation in trade,
investment and defence. At the same time, it will expect Bangladesh to slow
the pace of its engagement with Beijing.
Whether Dhaka can meet these expectations without compromising its own
interests remains to be seen.
The Road Ahead
Bangladesh stands at a critical moment in its history. Its economy has grown
rapidly over the past two decades, lifting millions out of poverty and
transforming the country into a major manufacturing hub.
But growth alone does not guarantee strategic independence.
As global rivalries intensify, Bangladesh must navigate a world where economic
partnerships are increasingly linked to geopolitical competition.
The Tarique Rahman government’s promise of “Bangladesh Before All” will be
tested not in speeches but in decisions—decisions about trade, defence,
infrastructure and diplomacy.
In the end, Bangladesh’s success will depend on its ability to remain pragmatic,
flexible and focused on national interests.
The country’s leaders must remember that foreign policy is not about choosing
sides in a global contest. It is about creating opportunities for national
development while safeguarding sovereignty.
Balancing Washington and Beijing will not be easy. But if handled wisely, it
could allow Bangladesh to turn geopolitical pressure into strategic advantage.
The question now is whether Dhaka can walk this narrow path without losing
